The One Belt One Road initiative is found to promote China's overseas lending in the belt road countries, especially for countries along the continental route. Such effect strengthens and persists for at least three years. Our findings show that launching a national strategy could be a decisive determinant of one country's outbound loans.
Introduction
Banks from developed countries often provide credits to developing countries (Dymski, 2003) , as marginal returns are usually higher in less developed regions (Healey, 1995) . Despite extensive studies regarding advanced countries' overseas lending (Goldberg, 2002; Porzecanski, 1981) , that of large developing countries such as China is largely left uncharted.
In addition to economic considerations, developing countries' overseas lending features political reasons, especially for state-owned banks having such objectives rather than profit maximization goals (Berger et al., 2004; Berger, 2007; Dinc, 2005) . 1 As China becomes an active international lender in recent decades, it is pivotal to ask whether and how China's overseas lending is motivated by its recent foreign policies.
This inspires our study of the grand One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy initiative and it is intriguing to investigate whether China's aggregate lending favors the OBOR countries in the wake of this national strategy. 2
2
The OBOR initiative was announced by President Xi Jinping in autumn 2013 during his visit in Kazakhstan, where he unveiled the vision of an 'Economic Belt' (i.e. the land belt) linking China with Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and ends up in Western Europe. Soon, President Xi proposed a similar 'Maritime Silk Road' (i.e. the sea road), which runs through Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, to the same destination as the Economic Belt. Comprising both the land belt and the sea road, the OBOR initiative is not only a network of ports, railways, roads, pipelines connecting China with the targeted regions, but a blueprint that access to new markets for trade and investments, and diplomatic policies to enhance multilateral relationships. Up to 2017, the OBOR strategy covers 68 target countries with around 8 trillion dollars invested in infrastructures such as transportation networks, energy, and telecommunications (Balding, 2017; Moser, 2017) .
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two folds. First, it mostly relates to recent works investigating the impacts of the OBOR initiative on trade and investments (e.g. Du & Zhang, 2018; Herrero & Xu, 2017; Hurley et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019) . Furthermore, there are only narrative descriptions rather than statistical evidences discussing China's loans and grants to OBOR countries (Bräutigam, 2011; Cheng, 2016; Kynge, 2015; Lin & Wang, 2017; Yu, 2017) . Our work fills the gap and establishes a causal relationship of the policy impact on China's outbound loans.
Second, studies relating to China's overseas lending (Dreher & Fuchs, 2016; Dreher et al., 2018; Hurley et al., 2019) often do not take "hidden debts" (i.e., undisclosed foreign official lending flows) into account. Zucman (2013) and Coppola et al. (2019) argue that China's lending to developing countries involves offshore financial centers and/or borrowers' foreign banks, which make China's oversea loans hard to track. Since such opaqueness could potentially bias the results, we use a new data set complied by Horn et al. (2019) that explicitly addresses such problems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and variables, Section 3 shows the identification strategies, Section 4 presents the empirical results, Section 5 checks the robustness of the results and Section 6 concludes.
Data and variables
Our main data is from Horn et al. (2019) , which includes oversea debt stocks owned by Chinese official and state-owned creditors. It mitigates the "hidden debt" Table 9 .0 (Feenstra et al., 2015) .
We mainly follow Du & Zhang (2018) to construct the belt-road country list. We also manually check the news and update the country list, as the coverage of the OBOR is constantly expanding. According to China's official announcements or news reports, we further collect the years of agreement signed with those OBOR countries, which we use in section 5. 3
Our final sample contains 105 recipient countries, with 51 OBOR countries (38 on the land belt and 13 along the sea road) from 2010 to 2017. 4 Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables and Appendix Table A lists the variable definitions and their sources.
[ Table 1 about here]
Identification Strategy
To gauge the impact of the OBOR initiative on China's overseas lending, we employ a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy, following Du & Zhang (2018) and Mao et al. (2019) . Specifically, we use the OBOR countries as the treatment group and 3 The country list and their OBOR signature years are provided in the online supplementary material, Table A1 and Table A2 respectively. 4 Our choice of the start year is standard and follows the related literature such as Du & Zhang (2018) .
the non-OBOR countries as the control group. Treating the policy announcement in late 2013 as an exogenous shock, we define years on or after 2014 as the post period, and
year 2010 to 2013 as the pre-shock period. Our baseline DD model is thus specified as follows:
where is the logarithm of China's total overseas lending to country i in year t.
is a dummy variable and equals to 1 if t is after year 2014 and 0 otherwise.
is an indicator variable and equals to 1 if the recipient country i is an OBOR country and 0 otherwise. is a vector of country i's year-varying controls such as GDP, population, capital stock, exchange rate, etc. Note that model (1) does not include and , as they are absorbed by the recipient country ( ) and the year fixed effects ( ) respectively. The standard error is clustered at borrower country level to account for potential serial correlations within that country. Moreover, loan commitments could also be path-dependent, as loans to developing countries often follow schedules spanning over years (Kraay, 2014) . To alleviate such concern, we include lagged loan amount in some specifications. We also present results incorporating the lagged country controls.
To substantiate our argument that the change in China's overseas lending is solely due to the OBOR initiative, we adopt the following time-varying DD model that treats the OBOR agreement year as the shock year:
where is a dummy variable and equals to 1 after country i signs the agreement with China in year t, and 0 otherwise. Other notations and the cluster standard error are the same as model (1). The coefficient of interest, 1 , estimates how loan amount changes for signatory i.
Empirical Results
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 presents the coefficients of year fixed effect from 2011 to 2017, using 2010
as the base year. The advantage of this standard approach is to control for countries'
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities (Schularick, et al., 2012) . It is observed that the OBOR countries tend to receive more loans and the growth rate also increases after 2014. In contrast, the non-OBOR countries have relative steady experience through 2011 to 2017, reflecting the fact that the OBOR strategy neither promotes nor harms their loans.
[ Table 2 about here]
Next, we turn to our DD analysis. Table 2 shows the result of the pre-trend analysis.
As all pre-shock year interaction terms are not significant, the parallel trend assumption of our DD strategy is thus valid. That is, the commitment loan amounts between the OBOR and the non-OBOR countries exhibit no statistical differences for the years prior to the policy announcement.
[ Table 3 about here]
Then we turn to our main results examining the impact of the OBOR initiative on
China's overseas lending. Column (1) and (2) of Table 3 show significant and consistent positive effects of this national strategy by comparing the changes between the OBOR countries and the non-OBOR countries, regardless of whether lagged country controls are included or not. 5 The results still hold in column (3) and (4) when controlling for the lagged loans, ruling out the possibility that the increased lending after the policy initiative is purely due to the previous loan agreements. In particular, the positive significant coefficient of lagged one lending supports the argument that
China's policy loans could be path-dependent (Kraay, 2014; Mattlin & Nojonen, 2015) .
Quantitatively, the coefficient in column (4) shows that on average, China's oversea lending to the OBOR countries increases by 98 percent after this grant policy initiative.
Next, we explore the potential heterogeneities on loans to the continental and the maritime routes. Columns (5) to (8) exhibit a strong inclination on loans to the land belt countries, after controlling country lagged controls and/or lagged loans. It implies, according to column (8), that the land belt countries' loans are about 1.3 times higher in the post-strategy years relative to those of sea road countries. Such drastic expansion might be justified by the large-scale infrastructure projects in the land belt countries (Cerutti & Zhou, 2018) , which is consistent with the findings regarding China's outward direct investments (ODI) (Du & Zhang, 2018) .
[ Figure 2 about here]
We further show the dynamic effect of the OBOR initiative on China's overseas suggests the long run vision of this national strategy and the increasing commitments from Chinese official creditors.
Robustness check
[ Table 4 about here]
One potential critique could be that our results might be purely driven by other factors rather than the OBOR initiative itself, as many other confounding incidents affecting China's official lending could take place in model (1)'s common shock year setting. To address the concern, we employ an extended DD model incorporating one crucial recipient country time-varying factor, the signature year of the OBOR agreement, into the benchmark model, as China signed the OBOR agreements with countries in various years.
The impacts of loans on the OBOR countries and the land-based countries are presented in Table 4 . Column (1) and (2) indicate that the agreement to join the initiative causes a strongly positive effect on China's overseas lending relative to their nonsignatory and sea-road peers respectively, suggesting the substantial supports from Chinese official creditors in advocating this national strategy. Both specifications control for the lagged treatment up to three years, and no significant changes of China's lending are found prior to the year of signature. Thus, they alleviate the reverse causality concerns and show the robustness of our estimations. That is, it is not the loan commitments per se that entice countries to join the OBOR initiative and to sign the agreements.
Conclusion
Using a novel and rigorous aggregate loan data, this paper investigates whether
China's overseas lending favors the One Belt One Road countries. Our difference-in- (1) is the baseline and column (2) adds the country lagged controls. Column (3) and (4) include the lagged loans up to 3 years with and without lagged country controls. Columns (5) to (8) * is a dummy variable and equals 1 after land-based country i signs the agreement with China in year t, and 0 otherwise. The country fixed effect, the year fixed effect, country controls and lagged treatment variables it up to three years are included in all specifications. Column (1) presents the result for the OBOR countries and column (2) is for the land belt countries. Robust standard errors, clustered at recipient country level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) Countries denoted by # and * are the land-road countries and the sea-belt countries respectively. Table A2 The signatory years of the One Belt One Road countries. This table illustrates the signatory years of the recipient countries, as to their alphabetical orders and the news sources respectively.
